ModulesBarrier ManagementProcess Safety
Every barrier you take credit for, proven.One element per barrier, with the proof and the reason behind its status.
For process safety engineers and instrument and maintenance leads: build the register from HAZOP & LOPA credits, bowtie barriers or a CSV of PSVs and trips, then prove each element against a standard you can measure.
| Element | Type | Standard | Status | Credits | Bowties |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
BE-0012 · PSV-201 relief to flarePSV-201 | Relief device | PSV · v2 | In placeverified 3 Oct 2026 · next due 3 Oct 2027 | 2 | 1 |
BE-0013 · ESD valve XV-201XV-201 | Shutdown | ESD valve · v1 | Not in placeF2 failed on 30 Oct 2026, not restored | 0 | 0 |
BE-0014 · PAHH-201, operator isolates steamPAHH-201 | Alarm and response | Alarm and operator response · v1 | Not assessedR1 verification 71 days overdue | 1 | 1 |
BE-0015 · LSHH-202 high-high level tripLSHH-202 | Shutdown | SIF · v3 | ImpairedImpaired · active bypass | 1 | 0 |
BE-0016 · Deluge DV-201DV-201 | Fire protection | Deluge · v1 | Not in placeR2 failed on 21 Oct 2026, not restored | 0 | 1 |
BE-0017 · Gas detection, vaporizer areaGD-201A/B/C | Detection | — | Not assessedno standard | 0 | 0 |
One register, two questions. An example site; the fields are the product’s, the values illustrative.
Where it connects
On the same loop: Bowtie Analysis, Bypass Control, Inspections & Audits and 38 more modules in one workspace.
Method note
Prove it in the field, or trust the maintenance system? Both schools are right.
Most proof tests already happen somewhere: a bench shop, a CMMS work order, a contractor’s certificate.
Leandro · Founder, UProcess
One school runs its own verification rounds, so the people who answer for the barrier see it work. The other records the tests the plant already does, because a second inspection of the same PSV adds cost and no proof. Both fail when the result never reaches the barrier it proves.
So each criterion is proven where the work is already done, and counts the same way.
- Inspection roundThe standard’s criteria run as a round in Inspections, with as-found values and pass or fail.
- External testA bench certificate or a CMMS proof test, recorded with the document, who did it and whether they were independent.
- DrillResponse criteria proven person by person, from the element’s drill roster.
Where Barrier Management usually breaks
Four places barrier assurance goes wrong, and what the register does about each.
The standard says it works, and nothing you can measure.
A three-year offshore inspection programme found many performance standards generic rather than measurable, and acceptance criteria often missing from the work orders that tested the equipment.
Source: HSE Offshore, KP3 asset integrity report
In UProcess Each criterion states what is proven, how, how often and what passes: a range, a minimum, a maximum or yes or no. An element overrides a value only with a written reason.
PSV · v2 · applied to BE-0012
- F1 · Opens at set pressure
- 19.0 bar g ± 3 % · as-found required · every 12 months
- R1 · Proof test interval
- Every 12 months · assumed by LOPA
- A1 · Inlet and outlet valves locked open
- Yes or no · every month
No overrides on BE-0012. An override needs a reason.
A test that leaves the barrier disabled.
After Buncefield, HSE warned that a tank level switch is left inoperative if its test lever is not relocked, and that a faulty switch can still look normal under test.
Source: HSE safety alert, COMAH large tanks
In UProcess Each proof records as-found and as-left per criterion. A failed result keeps the element Not in place, naming the criterion and the date, until a passing result restores it.
BE-0016 · Deluge DV-201 · R2 · Deluge valve opens on demand
| Date | As found | As left | Result | By |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21 Oct 2026 | Did not open | — | Fail | Jonas Weber · independent |
Not in place · R2 failed on 21 Oct 2026, not restored
Bypassed, and still counted.
The CSB found an operator used an emergency air hose to override the interlock on a pressurized reactor’s bottom valve, and urged the company to improve control of safety interlocks.
Source: U.S. Chemical Safety Board, Formosa Plastics Illiopolis
In UProcess An active bypass in Bypass Control makes the element read Impaired or Out of service, and every LOPA credit it carries joins the credit-at-risk list.
BE-0015 · LSHH-202 high-high level trip
- Status
- Impaired · active bypass
- Bypass
- BY-0041 · until 18:00 today
- LOPA credit
- HAZOP-0007 · scenario 2.4 · PFD 1.0E-01
The credit appears on the credit-at-risk list while the bypass is active.
The credit outlives the test.
HSE’s COMAH guidance on control systems says that where few failures reveal themselves, a safety system’s integrity is critically dependent on its proof test interval, and that a quoted integrity level should come with the interval it assumes.
Source: HSE COMAH technical measures, control systems
In UProcess Credit at risk lists every LOPA credit whose element is not in place, or whose last pass is older than the interval the standard assumes, beside the interval the HAZOP wrote.
Action Tracking · AT-0151
Proof test PAHH-201 and the operator response
- Owner
- David Chen
- Due
- 20 Nov 2026
- From
- Barrier Management · BE-0014 · credit in scenario 2.1
R1 passed with as-found recorded, response within 10 min · checker Emma Clarke
Element BE-0012 · PSV-201 relief to flare
| Date | Criterion | As found | As left | Result | Performed by | Independent | From |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 Oct 2026 | F1 · Opens at set pressure | 19.4 bar g | 19.0 bar g | Pass | Valve Services Ltd (bench) | Yes | External test · certificate VS-26-1187 |
| 3 Oct 2026 | R1 · Proof test interval | — | — | Pass | Valve Services Ltd (bench) | Yes | External test · certificate VS-26-1187 |
| 1 Oct 2026 | A1 · Inlet and outlet valves locked open | Yes | Yes | Pass | Ana Ribeiro | No | Inspection round IR-0412 |
| 2 Sep 2026 | A1 · Inlet and outlet valves locked open | Yes | Yes | Pass | Ana Ribeiro | No | Inspection round IR-0377 |
The record an auditor asks for.
Status is a sentence built from records, never a colour chosen in a meeting.
- Every proof result: date, criterion, as-found and as-left, who performed it and whether they were independent.
- Each performance standard as published versions, and the version each element follows.
- Every LOPA credit on the element, with the PFD, test interval and response time taken from the HAZOP.
- An element history, overrides with their reasons, and voided tests with why.
What’s in an element
- Element
- Number, name, equipment tag, type shared with Bowtie, owner, standard version, critical mark.
- Standard
- Criteria by section, from functionality to interactions, each with method, frequency and acceptance. Published as versions; one criterion can carry the interval LOPA assumes.
- Proof
- Inspection rounds, external tests with their document, and drills person by person.
- Status
- In place, Impaired, Out of service, Not in place or Not assessed, always with its reason: “verified 3 Oct 2026 · next due 3 Oct 2027”.
- Links
- LOPA credits with a snapshot and “Source changed”, the bowtie barriers that draw it, and any bypass on it.
Questions
Do we need bowties to use it?
No. Build the register from HAZOP & LOPA credits, by hand or from a CSV of PSVs and trips. Bowties link when you have them.
Does it replace our maintenance system?
No. Work orders stay there. A test done there is recorded here as an external result, with its document.
What makes an element critical?
A LOPA credit, or the team’s mark. A credited element counts as critical without being marked.
Can it change the PFD in our HAZOP?
No. It reads the credit and shows when the proof does not back it. The HAZOP changes only in the HAZOP.